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STATUTORY VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER*
The purpose of this note is to examine the existing statutory law on the sub-
ject of voluntary manslaughter and to submit a model statute. An examination
of the statutes of voluntary manslaughter at common law will provide a helpful
background.
Manslaughter is that group of homicides which lies between murder, on the
one hand, and excusable or justifiable homicide, on the other. The absence of
malice is the chief difference between murder and voluntary manslaughter. Vol-
untary manslaughter, at common law, was said to be the unlawful, intentional
killing of a human being without malice aforethought.,
In describing voluntary manslaughter, the courts have developed the idea
that intentional murder is "reduced" to manslaughter.- This is not exactly ac-
curate for there is only one crime involved i.e., manslaughter. It seems that tis
idea is used to rationalize and distinguish this crime from the more serious one of
murder. This so-called "reduction" is accomplished by what is denoted as a
provocation or a heat of passion.
The common law recognized four legal provocations: (1) seeing ones spouse
in the act of adultery, (2) an illegal arrest, (3) assault and battery, and (4) a sud-
den, mutual affray.3 In each of these provocations, the law recogmzed that this
was an occasion where a person might be extremely provoked; that he would be
in such "hot blood" that he might possibly kill. Although the law feels that a
reasonable man should not kill in such circumstances, it compromses with this
idea by establishing these legal provocations. It will be noted that m each of
the four situations, a heat of passion may be aroused in the person perpetrating
the homicide. If the person kills while under the influence of this heat of passion,
he is thus guilty of voluntary manslaughter because he is temporarily deprived of
his rationality and cool reflection.
The homicide must have been committed while under the influence of this
provocation causing heat of passion. The defendant must have actually been
provoked to the point of heat of passion by one of the legal provocations, or the
crime will be murder.' However great the provocation may have been, if suffi-
cient time has elapsed whereby the defendant could reasonably have cooled off,
and the homicide is then committed, it will also be murder. It is usually a ques-
tion-of fact whether the person has cooled off or not.
Although the law recogmzes only four legal provocations giving rise to a heat
of passion, it is reasonable to assume that a person could, in fact, be provoked into
hot blood by other situations. For example, words alone, might cause a defendant
to act irrationally and kill, although the law has not taken thus step. However, it
seems as though it is not logical to categorically limit a heat of passion to the four
legal passions.
Heat of passion and provocation are not the only situations where the law
has found a person guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Some cases of imperfect
self-defense and partial insanity have been used to reduce the crime to voluntary
manslaughter. Such situations might well be thought to be a type of extenuating
* This is a compamon note to the one by Mr. Gromley on p. 113.
State v. Trusty, 1 Penn. (Del.) 319, 40 Ad. 766 (1898).
Allison v. State, 74 Ark. 444, 86 S.W 409 (1904); Chambers v. Conn. 6
Ky. L. Rep. 448 (1884); Com. v. Webster, 5 Gush. (Mass.) 295, 804, 307 (1850).
34 BL. COM. 191.
'State v. McCan, 1 Spears (S. C.) 384 (1842).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
circumstances which the law considers sufficient to mitigate the seriousness of
the crime.'
In considering the various statutory provisions in the United States concerning
voluntary manslaughter, the writer has noted five main classes, each of which will
be considered separately and then summarized.
I. Those which divide manslaughter into two kinds, voluntary and involuntary,
but which do not attempt any definition.
In this category there are six states; Kentuckv, North Carolina, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, Virgima, and West Virgima. Typical of these statutes is that of
Kentucky-
"Any person who commits voluntary manslaughter shall
be confined "a
The others are worded along similar lines.
Statutes in this category provide absolutely no guide as to what constitutes
the crime of voluntary manslaughter. Except for the pumshment they provide,
such statutes are practically worthless. The result of such a statute is that the
common law definition is followed.
IL Those which divide manslaughter into two types and give a short definition
of each.
An examination reveals that there are eleven statutes of this type. Califorma
is a good example:
"Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being,
without malice. It is of two kinds:
(1) Voluntary-upon a sudden quarrel or a heat of
passion,
(2) Involuntary- ,8
The other states having similar statutes are Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Idaho,
Indiana, Montana, New Mexico, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming.'
Most of these statutes use the phrase "upon a sudden quarrel or a heat of
passion." It should be noted that this is somewhat inconsistent with the idea
of the common law. At common law a sudden quarrel is just one of the four
7--l provocations." Heat of passion is a general term describing that state of
mind. resulting from each of these four provocations. It is confusing to attempt
to distinguish them, without providing at the same time, for the other provocations.
rNote, 36 Ky. L. J. 443 (1948).
GKY. R. S. 485.020 (1948).
7 1 N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. sec. 18 (1943); 10 Omo GEN. CODE ANN. see.
12404 (Page, 1939); PA. STAT. tit. 18, sec. 2225 (Purdon, 1936); VA. CODE ANN.
sec. 4396 (1943).8 CAL. PENAL CODE sec. 192 (Deering, 1941).
ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 14, sec. 320 (1940); 3 Aruz. CODE ANN. sec. 43-2904
1943), 4 Arm. STAT. ANN. sec. 41-2207 (1947); 1 IDAHO CODE ANN. sec. 17-1106
1932); 4 IND. STAT. ANN. sec. 10-3405 (Burns, 1942); 4 MONT. REV. CODES see.
10959 (1935); 3 N. M. STAT. ANN. sec. 41-2407 (1941); 7 TENN. CODE ANN.
sec. 10774 (Williams, 1934); 5 UTAH CODE ANN. see. 28-5 (1943); 1 Wyo. CoN,.
STAT. ANN. c. 9, see. 205 (1945).
"CLARK AN MARSHAL.L, CiRiuEs sec. 256 (1940).
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The statute provides for only one of the provocations by classing it with heat of
passion.
It is felt that heat of passion is the basic element which "reduces" murder
to manslaughter. Thus, thus type of statute at least goes a long way toward con-
tinuing the common law concept. However, the statute is much too indefinite
to set up any standard by which the courts can act. Here, also, the result has
been that the cases have been decided largely on the basis of the common law.
III. Those statutes which go into greater detail in attempting to codify the com-
mon law.
There is so much diversity in the statutes in this group that it is questionable
whether all the states included are properly in this category. However, it is felt
that the ultimate purpose of the legislature was the same in each statute.
The typical statute is similar to that of Georgia:
"Sec. 64. Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a hu-
man creature, without malice, either express or implied, and without
any mixture of deliberation whatever, which may be voluntary, upon
a sudden heat of passion, or involuntary
"See. 65. In all cases of voluntary manslaughter, there
must be some actual assault upon the person killing, or an attempt
by the person killed to commit a serious personal injury on the person
killing, or other equivalent circumstances to justify the excitement
of passion, and to exclude all idea of deliberation or malice, either
express or implied. Provocation by words, threats, menaces, or con-
temptuous gestures shall in no case be sufficient to free the person
killing from the guilt and crime of murder. The killing must be the
result of that sudden, violent impulse of passion supposed to be
irresistible; for if there should have been an interval between the
assault or provocation given and the homicide sufficient for the
voice of reason and humanity to be heard, the killing shall be
attributed to deliberate revenge, and be puished as murder.""
The twelve other states included in this category are Colorado, Illinois, Louis-
iana, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon;- South Ekota, and -Wisconsm."
-These statutes are a step in the right direction. The common law should be
condified, h~wever, in a concise, but complete manner. Generally, the statutes in
this group are too long and unwieldy. In the Georgia statute quoted above, there
is a great amount of detail as to the "cooling off" period. The writer feels that
this is-the type of thing that should be left up to the courts. Furthermore, al-
though the statute recognizes one of the four provocations, specifically, assault
and battery, it neglects to list the others. Thus, the result of this type of statute
is essentially the same- as that of the others discussed, i.e., most of the law in such
jurisdictions is determined by common law principles.
" 6 GA. CODE ANN. sees. 64, 65 (Park, 1914).
" COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 48, sees. 34, 35 (1935); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, sees.
361, 362 .(1947-); LA. CODE CRiuM. LAw & PRo. sec. 740-31 (Dart, 1943);
2 MINN. STAT. sec. 619.15 (1945); 5 NEv. Comp. LAws sees. 10069-10071 (Hill-
yer, 1929); II N. H. REv. LAWS c. 455, sec. 8 (1942); N. Y. Cuan. CODE sec. 1050
(Thompson, 1939); N. D. REv. CODE sees. 12-2715, 12-2717 (1943); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 21, sec. 711 (1941); 3 ORE. Comp. LAvs ANN. sec. 23-406 (1940); S. D. CODE
see. 2013 (1939); Wis. STAT. sec. 340.10 (1947).
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IV Those which give no definition or division of manslaughter, but merely pro-
vide for a punishment.
Connecticut offers a good example of this type of statute:
"Any person who shall commit manslaughter shall be fined
not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than fif-
teen years or both."
In this group, very similar to the first category, there are mine other states: Dela-
ware, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Ver-
mont, and Washington."
This is the poorest type of statute existing today. It provides no definition
for the courts to work with and, as opposed to the first category, it does not even
make a distinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter so as to pro-
vide a reason for a difference in the pumshment.
V Those statutes, which in addition to giving a brief definition of manslaughter,
list several specific acts which constitute voluntary manslaughter.
Florida is one of these:
"The killing of a human being by the act, procurement or
culpable negligence of another, m cases where such killing shall not
be justifiable or excusable homicide or murder shall be deemed
manslaughter "1
In the following sections, the statute provides that the following acts shall be
manslaughter: assisting self-murder; willful killing of an unborn child by injury
to the mother; abortion; unnecessary killing to prevent an unlawful act; killing
by a mischievous ammal; drowmng in an overloaded vessel; death from an ex-
ploding boiler in a racing steamboat; and killing by an intoxicated physician.
Other states in this group are Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, and Missouri.'
It is sufficient to say that this type of statute reflects the peculiar attitude of
these states toward certain types of homicides.
Texas abolished its manslaughter statute in 1927 and has not re-enacted
another." The statutes in Nebraska and South Carolina" do not fit exactly into
any of the above categories, but theit general effect is to enact the common law.
Considering the statutes in group I and group IV as being essentially the
same, it may be seen that sixteen of the states merely provide for a pumshment
for the crime of voluntary manslaughter, and offer no guide as to what constitutes
the crime. Groups II and III, which differ only m the degree in which they codify
" 2 CONN. GEN. STAT. see. 6046 (1930).
"DEL. REv. CODE c. 149, see. 5 (1935); II IowA CODE sec. 690.10 (1946);
1 MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 27, sec. 436 (Flack, 1939); GEN. LAWs MAss.
c. 265, sec. 17 (1932); 2 MicH. Compn. LAws sec. 17115-821 (1940); I N. J. REv.
STAT. sec. 138-5 (1937); R. I. GEN. LAws c. 606, see. 3 (1938); VT. PUn. LAws
sec. 8377 (1933); 4 WAsH. REv. STAT. ANN. sec. 2390 (Remington, 1932).
"FLA. STAT. ANN. sec. 782.07 et seq. (1941).
1KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. c. 21, sees. 407-413 (1935); ME. REV. STAT. c. 129,
see. 2 (1930); 2 Miss. CODE ANN. sees. 2220-2231 (1942); 1 Mo. REV. STAT. ANN.
sec. 4382 et seq. (1939).
"TEx. STAT. PEN. CODE, art. 1244 (1936).
REv. STAT. NED, c. 28-403 (1943).
"I S. C. CODE ANN. sec. 1107 (1942).
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the common law, include twenty-four states. This is by far the majority view
and seems to represent the better statute.
Model Statute:
The purpose of drafting a model statute on voluntary manslaughter is to
achieve uniformity and to establish a guide for the court in adjudicating such
cases. A desirable statute should take a middle ground between under-condifica-
tion and over-codification of the common law. It should not contain all the many
ramifications of the law of voluntary manslaughter for it would be unwieldy.
Latitude must be left for judicial interpretation by the courts in cases of unusual
circumstances.
It is submitted that a good statute for voluntary manslaughter should contain
the following elements: (1) a definition of the term voluntary manslaughter,
(2) some explanation about the relation of the crime to that of murder, (3) a
direct codification of the four legal provocations, and, (4) an explanation of the
term heat of passion.
The following might be such a statute:
A. Voluntary Manslaughter:
(1) Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful, intentional killing
of a human being without malice.
(2) The homicide involved here would be murder were it not
for the fact that it was done in a heat of passion:
(a) Heat of pasion is a state of mind where a reasonable
man is temporarily deprived of his powers of reason
and cool reflection.
(3) Four situations where a reasonable man could be provoked
into a heat of passion are:
(a) Seeing ones spouse in the act of adultery,
(b) Assault and battery,
(c) A sudden, mutual affray, and
(d) An illegal arrest.
(4) If the jury finds that the defendant, in fact, acted under a
heat of passion, but not caused by one of the four situations
in (3), they may, in their discretion, hold hun guilty of
voluntary manslaughter.
(5) The defendant shall be judged according to standards of a
reasonable man under similar circumstances.
It will be noted that the model statute, in its first section, uses the common
law definition of voluntary manslaughter and then in the second section, the crime
is distinguished from murder. This, it is hoped, will provide a guide to the courts
and juries.
Although the statute specifically codifies the four legal provocations in section
three, provision is made in section four for other situations of heat of passion.
This is a necessary element following from the writer s firm belief that heat of
passion is the basic element of the crime of voluntary manslaughter and that the
crime should not be necessarily limited to the four commonly accepted legal
provocations.
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